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ABSTRACT
This paper studies dynamic labor demand of private and state-controlled manufacturing plants in China.
A goal of the paper is to characterize adjustment costs for these plants. As our sample includes private
and state-controlled plants, our analysis uncovers differences in both objectives and adjustment costs
across these types of plants. We find evidence of both quadratic and firing costs at the plant level.
The private plants operate with lower quadratic adjustment costs. The higher quadratic adjustment
costs of the state-controlled plants may reflect their internalization of social costs of employment adjustment.
State-controlled plants appear to be maximizing the discounted present value of profits without a soft-budget
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This paper studies dynamic labor demand of private and state-controlled manufacturing
plants in China.1 These results can be used to study a wide variety of policy interventions,
such as labor market regulations and the relaxation of nancial market constraints, which
impact directly on factor demand at the plant-level. To predict the eects of these and other
interventions requires answers to two fundamental questions: (i) what are the adjustment
costs faced by plants in China and (ii) what are the objectives of plant managers? This
paper answers both of these questions.
There are a couple of features making this analysis unique. First, our attention is on
plants in China rather than labor market aggregates. Second, the Chinese data include both
private and state-controlled enterprises (SCE). While it is natural to assume the privately
owned plants maximize prots, the objective of a SCE is less clear. Our approach is to
specify a couple of alternative objectives and determine which one better matches pertinent
data facts.
We estimate the costs of labor adjustment and the objectives of private plants and SCE
using a simulated method of moments (SMM) approach. The idea is to use some key moments
of labor input, output and productivity at the plant level to infer the parameters of the
dynamic optimization problems.
In looking at the behavior of private and SCE, there are some striking similarities. First,
the SCE, like the private plants, appear to be maximizing the discounted expected value of
prots. Importantly, labor demand is not a static decision: adjustment costs are present and
imply forward looking behavior by plants. Second, the costs of adjusting hours is relatively
small for all plants though higher for private than SCEs. Third, the best tting model entails
a non-convex ring cost along with linear and quadratic adjustment costs. For both types
of plants, this non-convex adjustment cost applies if job destruction rates exceed 20%.
However, there are some notable dierences. The quadratic adjustment costs are much
larger for the SCE, perhaps reecting an internalized gain to employment stability. The cost
of adjusting hours is also lower for the public plants.
Finally, public plants discount considerably less than do private plants. For our analysis,
1As discussed in section 3, a state-controlled plant is determined by sharing holdings rather than regis-
tration. We sometimes refer to these as public plants as well.
22 DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
this is not an assumption but is instead a result of our estimation.
In terms of the objective of the SCE, they are best described as prot maximizers with an
added quadratic cost of employment adjustment. We allow public plants to operate under a
soft budget constraint where prots are non-negative. This does not improve the t of the
model.
2 Dynamic Optimization Problem
This section discusses the dynamic optimization problems for the privately owned plants and
SCEs. The generic dynamic optimization problem is
V (A;e 1) = max
h;e
 (A;e;h;e 1) + EA0jAV (A
0;e) (1)
for all (A;e 1). Employment adjustment is assumed to be completed within a period. The
function V (A;e 1) is the value function of a plant continuing in operation.2 The state vector
contains two elements: A is stochastic protability of the plant and e 1 is the stock of workers
in the previous period. The control variables are the hours worked per worker, h, and the
number of workers for the current period, e.
The function  (A;e;h;e 1) represents the current payo to the plant. Imbedded in this
function are the adjustment costs as well as the objective function. Ultimately, the dierences
between privately owned plants and SCE are captured by this function.
2.1 Privately Owned Plant
The generic model in (1) can be tailored to study a privately-owned prot maximizing
plants.3 The objective function for a privately-owned plant is
 (A;e;h;e 1) = R(A;e;h)   !(e;h)   C (A;e 1;e;h): (2)
Here R(A;e;h) is the revenue ow of a plant employing e workers, each working h hours in
protability state A. The revenue function has the form
2At this stage, we do not consider entry and exit decisions.
3The model follows the approach of Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) study of dynamic labor
demand for privately-owned US plants. A main dierence emerges in modeling the behavior of the SCEs.
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R(A;e;h) = A(eh)
: (3)
This revenue function is the product of a production function, dened over the total labor
input eh, and the demand curve facing the plant. The parameter  captures the curvature
of the production process along with the elasticity of demand. Other factors of production,
which are assumed not to entail any adjustment costs, are chosen optimally as well but are
implicit in revenue and thus in the optimization problem we study.4
The function !(e;h) in (2) is total compensation paid to the e workers each working h
hours. The compensation function takes the form
!(e;h) = e(!0 + !1h
): (4)
The parameters characterizing this function will be part of our estimation.5
The cost of adjusting the stock of workers is given by C (A;e 1;e;h). Following Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004), we consider a cost of adjustment function given by:
C (A;e 1;e;h) = F
+ + 







e 1 + (1   
+)R(A;e;h) (5)
if there is job creation e > e 1. Similarly
C (A;e 1;e;h) = F
  + 







e 1 + (1   
 )R(A;e;h) (6)
if there is job destruction e < e 1.
If e = e 1, so there are no net changes in employment, then C (A;e 1;e;h)  0. This
specication assumes that there are no costs of lling a vacancy created by a quit. Put
4That is, one can think of R(A;e;h) as the revenue obtained less the costs of the other inputs. Since
the quantities of those other inputs are dependent on (A;e;h), the R(A;e;h) captures these choices. The
functional form in (3) can be derived from a plant optimization problem over exible factors with a constant
returns to scale technology and a constant elasticity demand curve for plant output.
5This functional form is often used to characterize compensation, including overtime, in US data. The
Chinese Labor Law enacted in 1995 stipulates that employees work no more than 8 hours per day, and no
more than 44 hours per week. In addition, overtime hourly pay needs to be no less than: 1.5 times straight-
hour pay on weekdays; 2 times on Saturday and Sunday; 3 times on national holidays. The functional form
provides a smooth approximation to these requirements. For further discussion of compensation functions
and their representation see Bils (1987).
42 DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
dierently, the adjustment costs are on net not gross employment changes. This assumption
is consistent with the observation of zero net employment changes at a signicant fraction
of plants.
There are four forms of adjustment costs, with dierences allowed for the job creation
and job destruction margins. The rst is a quadratic adjustment cost, parameterized by
. There are two types of non-convex costs considered. One, parameterized by  is an
opportunity cost of adjustment: the plant losses a fraction (1   ) of its revenues when it
adjusts its labor force. A second, parameterized by F, is a more traditional xed cost of
adjusting the work force. In previous work on labor adjustment, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and
Willis (2004) found evidence in U.S. plants in favor of the opportunity cost model relative
to the xed cost form of non-convex adjustment costs. Finally, we allow linear adjustment
costs, parameterized by  to capture, for example, severance payments to workers. Here we
will study how well each of them matches key features of the data.
In addition to the dierences in adjustment costs of hiring and ring workers, this study
adds another feature: the use of thresholds for the non-convex adjustment costs. So, as a
leading example, the xed cost of ring (F  ) may apply only if the job destruction rate ex-
ceeds a bound. Through this modication of (6), we are able to capture certain institutional
features that may generate nonlinearities in adjustment costs.
The optimization generates choices along a couple of dimensions. First there is the
discrete choices of job creation, job destruction or inaction. The latter is an important
option given plant-level observations of no net employment changes. Second, there is the
continuous choice of job creation (destruction). If the job creation (destruction) rates exceed
the threshold, additional non-convex adjustment costs might apply. Third, there is the
adjustment of hours. Variations in hours will reect both the state of protability and the
choices on the extensive and intensive employment margins. If there is an opportunity cost
of employment adjustment, so that either (1    ) < 1 or (1   +) < 1, then the decreased
productivity will also aect the hours choice.
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2.2 State-Controlled Enterprise
The dynamic optimization problem for a SCE is potentially dierent from (1). The idea is
to infer the objectives of these enterprises from their actions.6
The key dierence we highlight is in the objective function of the SCE. In general, the
objective of the SCE is given by:
 (A;e;h;e 1) + S(A;e;h;e 1) (7)
Here  (A;e;h;e 1) is the same as in (2). Prots are here both because a SCE could
be interested in maximizing prot and also because tax revenues ow to state and local
governments. The second term in the objective function, S(A;e;h;e 1), covers objectives of
the SCE beyond prot maximization.
We consider a couple of models of S(A;e;h;e 1). The rst, termed the \employment
stabilizer", asserts that the SCE is interested in employment stability. Thus there is an
additional cost, beyond the adjustment cost already included in  (A;e;h;e 1) of employment









In this specication, the cost of employment adjustment is parameterized by S. This term
is exactly like the quadratic adjustment cost term already included in  (A;e;h;e 1) through
C(A;e;e 1). Hence the quadratic cost of adjustment for a SCE is straightforward to estimate
and compare to the adjustment costs for private plants.
A second model, termed the \job creator" adds a benet of job creation to the SCE's
objective function and penalizes the SCE for job losses. In this case,
S(A;e;h;e 1) = ~ F
+ (9)
when e > e 1 and
S(A;e;h;e 1) = ~ F
  (10)
6A similar approach underlies Gowrisankaran and Town (1997) who study the behavior of not-for-prot
hospitals, and estimate an objective function which includes both prots and quality. Sapienza (2002) studies
public and private banks in Italy.
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when e < e 1. If there are gains to job creation and costs to destruction, we would expect:
~ F + > 0 along with ~ F   < 0.
In many descriptions of SCE, the theme of a \soft budget constraint" arises. One inter-
pretation of this is that by following other objectives, imbedded in S(), the SCE may in fact
operate in a non-protable fashion.7 In that case, the government may provide a subsidy.
We model this by assuming that the rst term in the objective function (1) is given by
~  (A;e;h;e 1) = maxf0; (A;e;h;e 1)g (11)
where  (A;e;h;e 1) is dened in (2). With this subsidization, the SCE can undertake other
objectives, such as employment stability, without incurring sustained losses. Further, under
this objective, the SCE has no incentive to exit.
Finally, we estimate the discount factor for both private plants and SCEs. As suggested
by Cull and Xu (2005), it might be that SCEs operate with subsidized loans, from banks and
the government, which leads to them to discount less than private plants. This is potentially
a very interesting and important dierence between plants.
Our approach is to estimate the parameters for these specication of the SCE objective.
In some cases, we use the estimates from the prot maximizing plants to create a baseline
and to attribute SCE patterns of dynamic labor demand that dier from those of private
prot maximizing plants to these dierence in objectives.
3 Data
The data are from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production (1998-2007), conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. The raw data consist of all private plants
with more than ve million Yuan in revenue (about $700,000) and all public plants.8
7This draws upon the discussion of soft budget constraints in Lin and Li (2008). In that analysis, the
state imposes a \policy burden" on a SCE, such as employment stability, and must support the SCE in order
for it to remain in operation.
8Each observation in the raw data has a unique physical address. For example, in 2006, 17 observations
in 17 dierent locations, share the brand name of one of the biggest dairy product makers, Mengniu. Brandt,
Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2009) study productivity at the rm level over the 1998-2006 period. The data are
similar though since they note that about 95% of the rms own a single plant. From Brandt, Biesebroeck,
and Zhang (2009), the cut-o on private plants of ve million Yuan in revenues is likely to eliminate less
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The number of plants grows from over 160,000 in 1998 to above 330,000 in 2007. Since
there are numerous mergers, acquisitions, entry and exit, and public-to-private transforma-
tions before 2005, we focus on a balanced panel of plants excluded from the above changes
and in operation during the period 2005-2007.9 Another reason to look at the data after
2005 is that the year 2004 is characterized by many economic policies at the macro level to
curb the overheating of the economy.
The classication of the plants as public or private is an important element in our anal-
ysis. The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production has two variables dening whether an
enterprise is public or private. One is \enterprise type", representing state-owned, collective,
domestic private, joint venture, and foreign (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) pri-
vate enterprises. State-owned means the enterprise is owned by all the people in the country,
while collective means the enterprise is owned by part of the people in the country. Accord-
ing to the Chinese constitution, both state-owned and collective enterprises are classied as
public. An enterprise is termed as a joint venture if part of its shares is owned by foreign
investors or companies, no matter how big the fraction is. Enterprise type is the type that
the enterprise is registered with the Administration of Business and Commerce, as well the
Administration of Taxation. It does not have any information on who among shareholders
makes decisions. The decision maker of a joint venture can be either public shareholders or
private shareholders.
The other variable is \control of shares", representing state controlled, collectively con-
trolled, domestically privately controlled, and foreign (including Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan) privately controlled enterprises. \Control" means holding over 50% of total shares,
or being pivotal in decision making if not holding over 50% of total shares. By this standard,
a joint venture is public if it is state controlled or collectively controlled, even if it is not
registered as a state-owned or collective enterprise according to the enterprise type criterion.
For example, Volkswagen, Ford, and Honda in mainland China are all state-controlled joint
ventures. On the other hand, in our data we do see a large fraction of enterprises that are
registered as collective but are controlled by domestic private shareholders.
To make a clear distinction between public and private, we rely on the variable control
than 1% of the private plants. The analysis of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) covered the 1998-2005 period.
9This transformation in manufacturing is summarized in http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
publications/?fa=view&id=22633.
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of shares to determine the type of an enterprise. In the balanced panel we are looking at,
there are 13,255 state-controlled enterprises and 14,374 collectively-controlled enterprises,
both classied as public. Our private category consists of 120,719 domestically privately
controlled enterprises and 35,466 foreign (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) privately
controlled enterprises.
Table 1 summarizes capital, employment (number of workers employed), revenue, and
value-added by enterprise type for the 2005-2007 period.10 All monetary terms are deated to
thousand Yuan in 2005 using CPI. The survey includes a measure of plant-level "net capital"
constructed using a perpetual inventory method. Hours information is not available.
The columns split the sample into public and private plants. The columns called \trimmed"
are a subsample in which the top and bottom 2.5% of the plants, by employment size, are re-
moved to deal with outliers. For the public plants, the column marked large reports statistics
for this top 2.5% group. Unless stated otherwise, we will focus on the trimmed sample.
About 85% of the sample consists of private plants, most of them are domestic not foreign
owned. In terms of numbers of workers (Emp.), the private plants are typically about half
the size of the public plants. Yet the public plants have value added (VA) and revenue (Rev.)
more than twice that of the private plants. The public plants are also considerably more
capital intensive (Cap./Emp.) on average.
In terms of average revenue per worker, the public plants are more productive than the
private plants on average. The foreign plants have the highest revenue per worker among
private plants but this is still less than the productivity in the large public SCE. In terms of
average revenue per unit of capital, the public plants are about as productive as the private
ones. In fact the revenue per unit of capital is almost identical for the large public SCE and
the foreign private plants.
As noted earlier, we focus on the 2005-07 period to exclude periods of substantial change
in the structure and ownership of plants. For purpose of comparison, Table 2 provides similar
data for public and private plants from an earlier period, 1998. In this earlier period, the
fraction of public plants is 69% of the total, compared to only 15% in the later period.11 The
10Because the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production is a census conducted by the NBS and not by
the Administration of Taxation, we believe the information reported is unlikely to be contaminated by tax
evasion incentives.
11This period is reected in the discussion in Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006) which emphasized the presence of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































public plants in the total sample were larger than private plants in terms of value added,
revenue, employment and capital. The large public enterprises were considerably larger.
Productivity, measured either as the average revenue product of capital or labor was much
lower in public than private plants. This is particularly true for the large SCE, which are
particularly unproductive. These large dierences in productivity are not apparent in the
recent sample.
As we shall see as our analysis proceeds, the public plants are not that dierent from
the private ones. Given the results in Tables 1 and 2, perhaps this reects privatization and
modernization of public plants.12
4 Quantitative Analysis
The estimation follows two procedures. As in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), some of
the parameters are estimated directly from data on revenues. The remainder are obtained
through a simulated method of moments approach.
4.1 Parameter Estimates of Revenue Function
Using data on revenues and the labor input at the plant level for the trimmed sample, we
can estimate  from Rit = AitL
it, where Lit is the total labor input at plant i in period
t.13 In addition, we use these regression results to back-out the protability shock, Ait, as
a residual and from this we can infer the process for this shock. We then create a discrete
representation of the process as an input in computing conditional expectations for the
dynamic optimization problem at the plant level. This procedure is followed for both public
and private plants.
The results of the IV estimation are shown in Table 3. Here  is the curvature of the
revenue (prot) function and  is the serial correlation of the protability shock process.14
12This is consistent with Table 3 of Brandt, Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2009) though our determination of
private vs. public diers.
13These regressions used plant-level wages and initial capital stock to control for some of the plant-level
heterogeneity. For the case of opportunity costs, the estimation included a dummy variable for employment
adjustment to control for the eects of disruption costs. Those results are close to the ones reported in Table
3. The data appendix provides more detailed discussion of this estimation.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The instruments for IV estimates were twice lagged inputs. The details for the IV estimates




Table 3: Results from Revenue Function IV Estimation
From these results, we see that the curvature of the revenue function is larger for public
plants, compared to private ones. If we impose constant returns to scale in the production






 (1   e)
(12)
where  is the elasticity of demand and e is the coecient on the labor input in the Cobb-
Douglas production function.15 Thus dierences in  must either reect dierences in the
elasticity of demand or factor shares.
As noted in Table 1, private plants have a higher labor to capital ratio than the public
plants. If all plants face the same factor prices, then e is higher for the private plants. Thus
to explain the lower value of  in Table 3, , the elasticity of demand, of the private plants
must be lower. That is, private plants have more market power and thus larger markups
than public plants.
Alternatively, Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2009), among others, argue that public
plants have easier access to capital markets. All else the same, this would translate into
higher capital to labor ratios for the public plants without there being any dierences in
technology. Still a lower  is needed for private plants to explain the lower .
is large since  is estimated from panels of private and public plants separately.
15As discussed in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) and the related literature,  is given from the







where e and K are the respective labor and capital shares,  is the price elasticity of demand for the good,
and r is the rental rate on capital. Maximization with respect to capital leads to the reduced form revenue
function over total hours with an exponent given in (12).
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Finally, from the perspective of the analysis in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), dierences in
capital to labor ratios may reect dierent frictions in factor allocation. The higher capital
to labor ratio in public sector would indicate a lower friction in capital relative to labor for
the SCE.
The estimates in Table 3 pertain to data pooled across all sectors of the economy. Sectoral
dierences in technology and/or the elasticity of demand could also account for the estimates
reported in Table 3.
The protability shocks are highly serially correlated for both types of plants. The
processes of the protability shocks are stationary. Given the costs of hiring and ring
workers, the serial correlation of these shocks is important for the choice between adjusting
hours and the number of workers in response to variations in protability.
The variability of the shocks to protability are set to match the size distribution of
plants in the trimmed data set. The minimum size of the plants in the private and public
(trimmed) data set is about 50 workers and the largest is about 1500. The standard deviation
of the shocks, along with the (!0;!1) are set to produce an employment distribution within
this range and to match the median establishment size.16
4.2 SMM Estimation Approach
The remained parameters are estimated via SMM. This approach revolves around nding
the vector of structural parameters, denoted , to minimize the weighted dierence between







The weighting matrix, W, is obtained by inverting an estimate of the variance/covariance
matrix obtained from bootstrapping the data. The resulting estimator is consistent.17
In this expression, Md are the data moments for private and public plants, Ms() are
the simulation counterparts. The moments are listed as the columns in Tables 5 and 7.
16For the public plants, the standard deviation of the innovation of the protability shocks is set at 0.45,
which is just about the estimate inferred from the estimation of the revenue functions. For the private plants,
the standard deviation of the innovation is much larger, 0.90, in order to match the size distribution of the
plants. This dierence in variability of the shocks appears to stem from the lower value of  in the revenue
function for the private plants.
17See, for example, the discussion and references in Adda and Cooper (2003).
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The std(r=e) is the standard deviation of the log of revenue per worker. The moment sc
is the serial correlation in employment. The distribution of the job creation (JC) and job
destruction (JD) as well as the inaction rate (zero net employment change) are the remaining
seven moments. These are averages across plants and years. The inaction rate of nearly 40%
for the private plants and 28% for the public plants motivates the inclusion of non-convex
adjustment costs.
The simulated moments are obtained by solving the dynamic programming problem in
(1) for a given value of . The resulting decision rules are used to to simulate a panel data
set. The simulated moments are calculated from that data set.18
The parameters estimated by SMM are   (;;+; ;F +;F  ;+; ;).19 The mo-
ments were selected in part because they are informative about these underlying parameters.
Roughly speaking, the curvature of the compensation function is identied from the standard
deviation of the log of revenue per worker.20 An increase in  will lead to a larger varia-
tion in employment relative to hours and thus a reduction in this moment. The quadratic
adjustment cost parameter, , is identied largely from variations in the serial correlation
of employment and from the prevalence of employment adjustments in the 10% range. The
distribution of employment changes, particularly the inaction and the large adjustments,
act to pin down the non-convex adjustment costs. Finally, variations in  inuence all the
moments, particularly the standard deviation of the log of revenue per worker. When, for
example,  is low, the future gains from employment adjustment are more heavily discounted
and so the plant relies more on hours adjustment.
We do not attempt to estimate and identify all the elements of  simultaneously. Instead,
we consider leading cases for both private and public plants. Accordingly, one specication
studies dierent forms of ring costs and then we look at dierent forms of hiring costs.
Relative to others studies, our approach is more exible in that we allow for asymmetric
adjustment costs and, as noted earlier, allow for the non-convex costs to apply only after
critical levels of employment adjustment. Further, our study includes the estimation of the
discount factor, which is potentially dierent between public and private plants.
18The simulated panel as 350 time periods and 400 plants. As the process is ergodic, the simulated
microeconomic moments are determined by the total observations.
19Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) do not estimate asymmetric adjustment costs.
20We do not have direct information on hours in the data set.
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4.3 Private Plants
Results for private plants are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. The rst table presents param-
eter estimates and the second contains the associated moments.
  +   F + F   +   
ring 1.76 0.010 na na na 0.02 na 0.036 0.862
hiring 1.68 0.013 na na -0.001 na 0.048 na 0.889
oppt. 1.545 0.272 0.9993 0.9034 na na 0.0 0.0 0.975
Table 4: Parameter Estimates: Private Plants
Instead of trying to estimate all of the adjustment costs parameters at once, we have
chosen to study some leading sub-cases. The rst focuses on ring costs. These costs
have two components: a linear cost which captures, among other things, any severance pay
obligations of the rm. The second is a xed cost of ring which we assume is incurred if
the job destruction rate exceeds a critical value.
The motivation was to consider some of the institutional ramications of large job de-
struction rates. These might range from the need to justify these adjustments to government
authorities, labor unrest in response to large rings and future eects on government regu-
lation from large job destruction rates. 21
In our estimation, we experimented with a number of critical values, ranging from 0 to
25%. The results reported here are for a 20% critical job destruction value which ts the
data best.22 The Labor Contract Law enacted in 2008 stipulates that job destruction in
excess of 20 employees and/or 10% of total employment needs to be justied to the plant's
Employees' Convention and the local administration oce of the State Ministry of Human
Resource and Social Security. While this law was passed after our sample, it is supportive
of the theme that large job destruction was associated with a political response and hence
an additional adjustment cost.
21The extend of labor unrest in China is well documented at http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?
itemid=363&catid=9&subcatid=60#06 and http://www.solidarity-us.org/current/node/26.
22To be precise, we estimated the model for these dierent critical values (0:0:05; 0:10;0:15;0:2;0:25) and
are reporting the best tting model.
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Looking rst at ring costs, there is evidence of both xed and linear ring costs. By
a normalization, the estimated xed ring cost is 2% of steady state revenues. The linear
adjustment cost is estimated to be 0.036 which is about 0.04% of steady state revenue. From
Table 1, this cost is about 25,000 RMB per worker, a little less than two years of median
wages in the sample. Since the xed cost only applies for job destruction in excess of 20 %,
the linear cost is important for obtaining inaction in adjustment since the adjustment cost
function is not dierentiable at zero net employment growth. There is also a sizable cost of
adjusting as  = 1:43 but this cost is lower than that typically used in studies of US plants.23
Finally, the model allows for some quadratic adjustment cost but the estimate of  is very
small.
As noted earlier, one important feature of our estimation is that we include estimates of
the discount factor. The estimate of  = 0:862 for the best tting model implies a marginal
borrowing cost of about 16%. This is certainly suggestive of some friction in capital markets,
particularly since this rate is substantially higher than the implied cost of funds for public
plants, as seen in Table 6 below.
std(r/e) sc JC30 JC1020 JC10 inaction JD10 JD1020 JD30 $/1000
Data 0.975 0.922 0.151 0.073 0.119 0.37 0.101 0.051 0.056
ring 0.989 0.935 0.189 0.050 0.117 0.402 0.049 0.022 0.070 8.76
hiring 0.994 0.938 0.186 0.051 0.114 0.411 0.047 0.027 0.090 11.51
oppt. 1.024 0.978 0.066 0.116 0.140 0.436 0.00 0.004 0.094 48.18
Table 5: Moments for private plants
In this table, std(r/e) is the standard deviation of the log of revenue per worker, sc is the serial correlation
in employment, JC30 is a job creation rate in excess of 30%, JC1020 is a job creation rate between 10% and
20% and JC10 is a job creation rate greater than 0 and less than 10%. The job destruction (JD) moments are
dened symmetrically. The entries are the fractions of observations with these rates of job creation and job
destruction.
The moments for this case, presented in Table 5, show how the model with seven pa-
rameters ts the nine moments. The model does well on the average standard deviation of
the log of revenue per worker and the serial correlation of employment. It also does well in
terms of matching the overall job creation rate though the model produces a bit too much
23See the discussion in Cooper and Willis (2004) and the references therein.
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job creation in excess of 30%. The linear cost of ring produces inaction, a bit in excess of
the observed rate. The model struggles to match the intermediate levels of job destruction,
though it matches the tail of the job destruction distribution quite well.
The t of the model, reported in the nal column, is very far from zero. In a statistical
sense, the model does not match the moments. This is partly because we are estimating a
single model for all of manufacturing. Further, the moments are quite accurately measured
so that the variance/covariance matrix has very small elements. Consequently, the weighting
matrix used in the objective function has very large elements. All of the elements along the
diagonal of the weighting matrix have an order of magnitude equal to 6.
The hiring cost model is shown in the second row of Tables 4 and the third row of Table
5. In this case, there is a linear hiring cost of about the same magnitude of the linear ring
cost estimated in the rst model. But there is no evidence of a xed hiring cost.24 For this
model, we did not see any rationale for considering dierent job creation levels at which
the xed hiring would apply. As in the ring cost model, the quadratic adjustment cost
is quite small. Compared to the ring cost model, there is a slightly smaller cost of hours
adjustment.
Looking at the moments for this case, the t of the model with hiring costs is not as good
as the ring cost model. The relative standard deviation and serial correlation moments are
matched reasonable well. The model also matches the overall job creation and destruction
rates but misses on the composition, putting too much of the distribution in the tails relative
to the data.
The issue of distinguishing hiring from ring costs is not new. If there are costs of ring
workers, then a rm has a reduced incentive to hire workers. In eect, the ring cost appears
to be a hiring cost. In their estimation of a structural search model, Cooper, Haltiwanger,
and Willis (2007) nd that many of the moments can be explained by a model with ring
costs and that neither specication can match all the moments of the employment growth
distribution.
The nal specication focuses on the contribution of opportunity costs of adjustment,
rather than xed costs. In this case, labor adjustment entails the shut-down of a plant for a
period of time represented by (1   i) for i = +; . As discussed in the data appendix, we
re-estimated the revenue functions for this model since the adjustment parameter interacts
24In fact, the point estimate indicates a slight xed benet for hiring.
184 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
with the ow of revenues. In this case we also allowed for a linear ring and hiring cost and
estimated  as well.
The results are shown in the row labeled \oppt." in the two tables. The parameter
estimates again indicate a cost of varying hours and more of a quadratic adjustment cost
than the previous model. The main source of non-convexity in this case is in the opportunity
cost associated with job destruction. The estimated lost revenue is large: almost 10%. There
is no evidence of either linear hiring or ring costs in this specication. In this case, the
estimated  = 0:975, much higher than in the other specication.
As a consequence, for this specication the job destruction rates, shown in Table 5, are
all very tiny. Along that dimension, this model fails to match the data. The t is not as
good as the ring cost model.
Overall, the best tting model is one with linear and xed ring costs. Importantly, the
non-convex adjustment cost applies when the job destruction rate exceeds 20%. And the
estimated discount factor is 0.862 for private plants.
4.3.1 Other Implications
There are some other properties of the estimated model with ring costs worth noting. While
these are not part of the formal estimation exercise, they indicate other dimensions along
which the model matches features of the data.
Returning to Table 3, we use the IV estimates to parameterize the private plant dynamic
optimization problem. At the estimated parameters, we simulated data and estimate using
OLS the relationship between revenue and the labor input and compare this against the OLS
estimate in Table 12. In the simulated data, the OLS estimation of the revenue function has
a curvature of 0.57, well above the value of  = 0:3198 used to parameterize this function.
The dierence, of course, reects the endogenous labor decision. The bias in the estimate is
not quite as large in the simulated data as in the actual data.
Our estimate does not utilize data on compensation. Yet the model has implications
for the cross sectional distributions of wages. These dierences arise from the plant-specic
protability shocks leading to dierences in hours across plants and through the estimated
compensation function to dierences in wages. The (time series) average of the coecient
of variation of compensation, which equals the standard deviation of compensation divided
by the mean of compensation, is about 1.3 in the model. In the data, it is slightly over 1.0.
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This dierence between model and data may reect excessive heterogeneity across plants in
the model relative to the data, less hours variation in the data relative to the model or less
sensitivity of compensation to hours variation in the data relative to the estimates.25
Finally, there is considerable employment inaction in the data which is replicated in the
model. One interesting question about the inaction is whether it is size dependent. In our
specication, the xed cost of ring is proportional to the average revenue and so does not
vary with the size of a particular plant. That is, the xed cost is not state dependent. This
contrasts with the opportunity cost model where the adjustment cost is state dependent and
is higher for larger plants. This suggests that looking at the pattern of inaction across plant
size might be informative about the nature of adjustment costs.
To do so, we looked at the correlation between size and inaction. In the data, the
correlation between inaction and size (measured as the number of workers) is -0.09. In the
simulated data this correlation is -0.0019. Thus the xed ring cost model is replicating the
independence of inaction from size found in the data.
4.4 Public Plants
Tables 6 and 7 present results for public plants. As we did for the private plants, we consider
some leading specications, indicated by the rows of these tables. The next section compares
the results for public and private plants.
The rst case is ring costs. As with the private plants, the best tting model had the
ring cost starting with a 20% job destruction rate. For that model, the cost of adjusting
hours is present but smaller than for the private model. The xed ring cost and the linear
ring costs are modest. We estimated  = 0:9242 for the ring cost model. It does seem
that the prot maximizing motive is an eective way to model the choices of these plants.
The overall job creation rate matches the data well but the model does not produce the
burst of job creation found in the data. The model has about the same inaction as in the
data. As with job creation, the overall job destruction rate is close but the model does not
have the bursts of job destruction.
As was the case with the private plants, the other two leading specications do not t
the data as well. The opportunity cost model highlights ring costs and thus is unable to
25As we do not have data on hours variation, it is not possible to check these explanations directly.
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match the pattern of job destruction found in the data.
The hiring cost model also does not t the data quite as well as the ring cost specication.
Note that this specication estimates a positive cost of hiring rather than a xed benet
to hiring as discussed earlier as an alternative objective for public plants. This is evidence
against the \job creator" objective of SCEs.
Finally, we estimated the model allowing for a soft-budget constraint. As described
earlier, in this specication, the public plant receives a transfer from the government to cover
any losses. Of the adjustment cost cases with the soft-budget constraint, the opportunity
cost model was closest to the data and is reported in the tables. This is quite dierent from
the results without the soft budget constraint. The estimated model has only an opportunity
cost of ring workers. The estimate of  in this case was 0.915.
However, as seen in Table 7 adding in the soft-budget constraint did not improve the t
of the model compared to the case of ring costs and no soft budget constraint. Thus we
conclude that the soft budget constraint is not inuencing the labor demand decisions of
these public plants.
  +   F + F   +   
Trimmed public plants
ring 1.21 0.485 na na na 0.022 na 0.056 0.9242
hiring 1.327 1.069 na na 0.001 na 0.11 na 0.975
oppt. 1.629 1.70 1.0 0.813 na na 0.0 0.0063 0.9985
Trimmed public plants with sbc
oppt. 1.93 1.05 0.999 0.987 na na 0 0.008 0.993
Table 6: Parameter Estimates: Public Plants
4.5 Comparing Public and Private Plants
Given the large number of cases it is useful to highlight key ndings. Here we focus on a
comparison of public and private plants.
For both public and private plants, the specication with ring costs ts the moments
best, with the xed cost of ring occurring with job destruction rates in excess of 20%. Com-
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std(r/e) sc JC30 JC1020 JC10 inaction JD10 JD1020 JD30 $/1000
Data 1.118 0.952 0.085 0.068 0.173 0.278 0.227 0.063 0.044
Trimmed Public plants
ring 1.084 0.992 0.003 0.078 0.215 0.331 0.271 0.083 0.000 2.806
hiring 1.034 0.993 0.001 0.0751 0.225 0.338 0.279 0.069 0.00 3.167
oppt. 1.166 0.967 0.045 0.127 0.197 0.393 0.00 0.024 0.065 7.110
Trimmed Public plants with sbc
oppt. 1.202 0.841 0.027 0.145 0.230 0.273 0.124 0.064 0.051 6.946
Table 7: Moments: Trimmed Public Plants
pared to private plants, public plants have lower costs of adjusting hours, higher quadratic
adjustment costs and higher linear adjustment costs.
Since one interpretation of the linear adjustment costs is severance payments, the larger
estimates of   for the public plants is consistent with the higher wages paid by these
plants. Returning to our discussion of the objectives of SCEs, we nd some support for
the \employment stabilizing" objective, seen here as higher quadratic adjustment costs for
public plants.
Finally, estimating  improves the t of the model slightly relative to the standard prac-
tice of assuming a discount factor. More importantly, we nd that public plants discount
considerably less than the private plants. This is consistent with accounts of nancial fric-
tions for private plants within China. Cull and Xu (2003) and Cull and Xu (2005), for
example, discusses the ow of (subsidized) funds to SCEs from public banks and the gov-
ernment. Among other things, they point out that the allocation of credit by state-owned
banks contains, in part, the bailout of SCEs. Hale and Long (2010) nd that the ratio of
interest expense to debt is almost twice as high for private plants compared to SCEs.
4.6 Sectoral Results
Our estimates thus far pertain to all manufacturing plants. This approach constrains the
parameters to be the same across sectors. We now study a couple of specic sectors: autos
(and parts) as well as steel and iron.
Table 8 is comparable to Table 1 in terms of providing some basic statistics on the
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(trimmed) public and private plants in the two sectors. Most of the plants in these sectors
are private. The public plants are considerably larger than the private ones. This is true in
terms of value added, revenues, employment and the capital stock. Public plants are more
capital intensive. The revenue per worker and revenue per capital measures of productivity
are all higher in the public plants. The dierence in productivity is most evident in the
revenue per capital measure in steel and iron.
Table 9 provides IV estimates of the revenue function for these sectors. Clearly there are
dierences across sectors in the curvature of the revenue functions and the persistence of the
shocks. For both private and public plants, the sectoral estimates of  are larger than for
total manufacturing.
The following two tables present estimate for the ring cost model by sector. For these
results, we estimated the model with ring costs, which was the best tting model for all
sectors.
Some of the basic patterns from total manufacturing appear in the sectoral results as
well. The public plants have signicantly larger quadratic adjustment costs and higher
linear adjustment costs. This is particularly true for the public steel and iron plants. Those
plants also have substantially larger xed ring costs.
One interesting dierence from the previous results is in the discount factors. For the
public auto plants, there is almost no discounting while the public steel and iron plants
discount more than the private plants. In the steel and iron sector, concern over excess
capacity has led the government to restrict credit to these plants and this may explain the
lower discount rate.26
In these two sectors, the discount factor for the private plants is much higher than it is
for overall manufacturing. It might be that the private plants in these sectors are parts of
rms with relatively easy access to capital markets.
As indicated in Table 11, the sectoral models t better. This is both because the pa-
rameter estimates are sector specic. In addition, with a smaller number of observations,
the terms in the variance/covariance matrix are larger and thus the terms in the weighting
matrix are smaller.
26This policy is discussed in: http://industry.oursolo.net/data/steel-industry-iron-capacity/ and
http://www.robroad.com/light-industry/index.php/capacity-industry-million/.
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Autos and Auto Parts Steel and Iron
All Public Private All Public Private
# plants 4,650 778 3,652 3,969 539 3,237
Value added 62,687 122,387 21,196 133,159 268,128 36,341
(524,559) (684,604) (60,372) (1,027,953) (1,024,121) (78,114)
Revenue 257,884 493,999 77,084 480,585 1,092,618 151,529
(2,078,417) (2,509,979) (230,453) (2,944,061) (3,548,125) (334,305)
Employment 336 537 177 534 1,110 168
(1,574) (808) (179) (3,406) (2,899) (207)
Capital 50,383 97,665 17,056 158,850 380,198 21,248
(365,652) (444,121) (47,459) (1,593,874) (1,432,630) (58,250)
Cap./Emp. 91 105 85 127 172 114
(158) (155) (153) (269) (509) (198)
VA/Emp. 127 128 120 235 234 229
(288) (252) (279) (509) (559) (507)
VA/Cap. 4.3 5.4 4 10.3 20.9 8.9
(43) (94) (22) (215) (543) (86)
Rev./Emp. 461 492 427 1,004 1,169 955
(958) (850) (919) (2791) (5838) (1940)
Rev./Cap. 15.1 16.1 14.7 43.6 78.4 38.8
(103) (173) (84) (854) (1942) (517)
Table 8: Types and Characteristics of Plants by Sector: 2005-2007
All monetary terms are in 1,000 RMB, deated to 2005 level. The trimmed sample is
the public (private) sample excluding the upper and lower 2.5% tails by employment size.
Standard deviations are parenthesized.
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Table 9: Sectoral Results from IV Revenue Function Estimation
  F     
Autos and Auto Parts
private 1.26 0.049 0.005 0.040 0.968
public 1.12 0.27 0.001 0.060 0.999
Steel and Iron
private 1.86 0.0161 0.013 0.033 0.956
public 1.39 0.827 0.037 0.499 0.907
Table 10: Parameter Estimates by Sector
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates labor adjustment costs for private and public plants. For all of these
plants, we nd evidence of adjustment costs in the form of xed and linear ring costs along
with quadratic adjustment costs. These xed ring costs apply when the job destruction
rate exceeds 20%. The quadratic adjustment costs for the trimmed sample of public plants
are larger than those for the private plants. Private plants discount the future more heavily
than do public plants.
Turning specically to the objectives of the public plants, we see no evidence of soft-
budget constraints inuencing the labor demand of public plants. Nor do we see evidence
of a positive benet to hiring for these plants. Instead, we see support for public plants
acting to stabilize employment, as reected by larger estimated quadratic adjustment cost
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std(r/e) sc JC30 JC1020 JC10 inaction JD10 JD1020 JD30 $/1000
Autos and Auto Parts
Private
Data 0.863 0.932 0.185 0.098 0.137 0.304 0.107 0.039 0.039
Sim. 0.759 0.963 0.085 0.076 0.147 0.370 0.097 0.062 0.041 0.442
Public
Data 1.012 0.967 0.084 0.104 0.201 0.231 0.206 0.061 0.031
Sim 0.999 0.981 0.055 0.103 0.185 0.256 0.146 0.102 0.032 0.038
Steel and Iron
Private
Data 0.943 0.933 0.173 0.075 0.107 0.361 0.098 0.050 0.054
Sim 0.960 0.910 0.197 0.067 0.094 0.354 0.054 0.045 0.079 0.136
Public
Data 1.154 0.982 0.094 0.0565 0.215 0.253 0.242 0.063 0.024
Sim 1.172 0.978 0.084 0.088 0.128 0.359 0.089 0.081 0.034 0.037
Table 11: Moments by Sector: Firing Cost Model
parameters for public plants.
This estimation exercises uses data prior to the introduction of worker protection regula-
tions in China. That intervention, in part, reected concerns about hours variation and the
lack of severance pay to workers. One interpretation of the xed ring costs for excessive job
destruction was a political one that may have been manifested in the recent regulations.27
Studying the impact of those new regulations on labor demand using our estimated model
is of considerable interest.
The results are also useful as inputs into an analysis of gains to reallocation. Given
our focus on private versus public plants, reallocation can occur within and across owner-
ship classes. We plan to use our model to study productivity implications of reallocation,
both in the present and in the earlier years of our sample. The theme of reallocation is




clearly important as well in considering the eects of the introduction of worker protection
regulations.
Appendix
This section discusses measurement of key variables and estimation of the revenue function
in (3) and section 4.1. \Revenue" in (3) refers to output price times quantity of output,
net of variable costs on inputs excluding labor. The data provide direct measures of output
in monetary terms, i.e. output price times quantity of output, which can be deated to
base-year measures using the consumer price index.
Although the \revenue" (hereafter referred to as \net revenue") in (3) is not directly
observed from the data, we can use the output price times quantity (hereafter referred to as
\gross revenue") in the data to estimate the curvature of the net revenue function () and
back out the protability shock. This approach is common in the dynamic factor demand
literature. The appendix of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) presents a detailed discussion
of the derivation and measurement issues in the context of a capital adjustment problem.
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function is given by y = ~ A(eh)eKK, where K
denotes inputs other than labor. These other inputs (hereafter referred to as capital) are
rented and incur no adjustment cost, with r being the rental rate. It is straightforward to
extend the production function with capital to a function with multiple variable factors.
Assume the plant faces an inverse demand function p = y 1=. Here  is the price elasticity
of demand for the good. The net revenue function is given by




   rK; (14)
where the rst term on the right-hand side is gross revenue. After optimization over K the
above equation yields





where  = K(1  1
). Note that the net revenue function and the gross revenue function are
the same up to a factor of 1   . Substituting the rst-order condition of the optimization










 1. If the production technology is constant returns to scale,
then the curvature of net revenue on employment in equation (16) is exactly the same as
(12).
We estimate the revenue function via generalized method of moments (GMM). Speci-
cally, we regress gross revenue from the data on total labor inputs (using total compensation
on labor as proxies for unobserved human capital dierences in workers). Plant-level initial
wage and initial capital stock are used as instruments to control for some of the plant-level
heterogeneity. The total labor inputs is the number of workers (quality adjusted using the
initial wage) as hours worked is not observed. The lag of revenue is not used as an instrument
as current protability is correlated with lagged protability and thus lagged revenue.
The OLS and IV results are shown in Table 12. The curvature estimates are considerably








Table 12: Results from Revenue Function Estimation
As China is a rapidly growing economy and our model is stationary, we include year
dummies as instruments to control aggregate protability shocks. In the case of opportunity
costs, the estimation incorporates a dummy variable for employment adjustment to control
for the eects of disruption costs. In this case, we nd  = 0:3968 for private plants and
 = 0:5593 for public plants, in comparison to the results in Table 3 for the xed cost case.
We infer the protability shock from the revenue function and the estimated coecient
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